A Corner Turned: Supreme Court of Canada Decisions of the Year Past by Bell, Charlotte A., Q.C.




Volume 34 (2006) Article 15
A Corner Turned: Supreme Court of Canada
Decisions of the Year Past
Charlotte A. Bell Q.C.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Bell, Charlotte A. Q.C.. "A Corner Turned: Supreme Court of Canada Decisions of the Year Past." The Supreme Court Law Review:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 34. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/15
A Corner Turned: 
Supreme Court of Canada Decisions 
of the Year Past 
Charlotte A. Bell, Q.C.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This year, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down two significant 
decisions, R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard1 (and its Nova Scotia 
counterpart, R. v. Stephen Marshall),2 and Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage).3 
Superficially read, these cases seem to represent a complete 
turnabout — in one case the Court adopts a very restrictive posture 
towards the protection of Aboriginal rights, and in the next, seems to 
adopt the opposite. 
Upon a more thoughtful read, when taken together, the cases 
suggest a more cohesive approach, and indicate where the Supreme 
Court is heading in the area of assertion and protection of Aboriginal 
rights. The purpose of this paper is to examine the two cases with a view 
to extracting their themes, and then joining these themes together in the 
articulation of a cohesive theory that will reveal the direction the Court 
will likely go in future Aboriginal rights cases. 
The paper will start with a brief review of the facts, findings of law, 
and conclusion as to the underlying approach of each case seriatum. It 
will conclude by comparing each of these seemingly inconsistent 
                                                                                                            
∗
  I gratefully acknowledge the fine work of my colleague Sheldon Massie in the following 
review of the cases. The entire case outline is his work. My work consists only of the sections 
headed “Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada”, and “The Balance in the 
Result.” [The following is what I think, and not in any way reflective of the views or approaches of 
my employer or my instructing principal, the Department of Justice, or the Attorney General of 
Canada.] 
1 [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 2005 SCC 43. 
2 Id. 
3 [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69. 
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approaches, and discussing how the apparent inconsistency can be 
resolved.  
II. R. V. JOSHUA BERNARD AND R. V. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Bernard and 
R. v. Marshall on July 20, 2005. The Court held the accused had not 
established either a treaty right to commercially harvest timber or 
Aboriginal title to the logging sites. 
1. Background 
The two appeals arise from provincial prosecutions in New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia for the commercial harvesting and sale of timber from 
provincial Crown land. The Aboriginal defendants asserted the 
unauthorized activity was a constitutionally protected right under the 
1760-61 Halifax treaties, and as an incident of their communities’ 
Aboriginal title to the land. Canada intervened in the appeals at the 
Supreme Court of Canada, heard together January 17, 2005, and argued 
against both propositions. 
2. The Decision 
The Court combined its reasons for both decisions, and was unanimous 
in their dismissal of the defendants’ appeals from conviction. The 
reasons of McLachlin C.J. were concurred in by Major, Bastarache 
Abella and Charron JJ. Justice LeBel wrote separate reasons with which 
Fish J. concurred. 
The majority concluded the treaty at issue granted the Mi’kmaq the 
right to continue to trade in the products that they had traditionally 
traded with Europeans. The issue, properly framed, was whether trade in 
a particular commodity was in the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of the making of the treaty. On the evidence, the Court concluded 
that trade in timber was not within the contemplation of the parties. The 
majority also confirmed that though treaty rights are not frozen in time 
and can evolve, this evolution does not mean the core right or protected 
activity may transform itself, but that the modern means of exercising a 
right are protected. 
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The majority concluded that in order to establish Aboriginal title an 
Aboriginal society must provide proof of the intention and capacity to 
retain exclusive control over the claimed territory at the time of 
sovereignty. This means activity on the land that is sufficiently regular 
and exclusive to comport with title at common law. They concluded 
there were no grounds to interfere with the trial judges’ findings that 
there was insufficient evidence of regular and exclusive use of the 
cutting sites by the Mi’kmaq people. 
The Court also found that the jurisprudence and historical context 
did not support a conclusion that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
reserved Aboriginal title in the former colony of Nova Scotia, and there 
was no basis for finding title to the cutting sites on the basis of the 
earlier and discredited Belcher’s Proclamation of 1762. 
3. Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(a) Treaty Rights 
The Supreme Court of Canada has, in Bernard, clearly said that the 
exercise of traditional treaty rights will be protected. The emphasis here 
is on the word “traditional”. A right practised at the time of treaty 
cannot transmute into a modern practice.  And so, hunting, fishing and 
gathering, things that were done historically, will attract constitutional 
protection, even if the way one hunts, fishes or gathers changes, but 
these activities cannot evolve into activities such as lumbering or 
mining. 
The Court came to the decision that it did by focusing on the 
“common intention” of the parties — certainly a legitimate exercise for 
interpreting an agreement between two parties. 
But there was another common intention of the parties, another 
focus that could have been chosen, in order to determine what the 
parties had hoped to gain by entering into the treaty.  The focus might 
well have been that the parties wished to ensure that the Mi’kmaq would 
not become a burden on the British Crown. The common intention of 
the parties with respect to how to achieve this focus, would be to enable 
the Mi’kmaq to participate in the economy of the British colony by 
giving them guaranteed access to the raw materials of the colony, which 
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they would then use to trade: a “strategy of economic aboriginal self-
sufficiency”. 4  
If this approach to isolating the common intention of the parties had 
been employed, the result would have been to position the Mi’kmaq as 
partners in the exploitation of the resources of the provinces, and 
participants in the modern economy. Instead, the decision positions 
them as a community entitled to exercise traditional rights. 
(b) Aboriginal Title 
The map of Canada, as envisioned by some, looked very different 
before and after the Bernard and Marshall decisions. The 1997 
Delgamuukw decision evoked visions of vast tracts of hunting territory, 
“exclusively used and occupied” by a First Nation (essentially, being 
under the sovereign power of a First Nation), that were declared to be, 
in the present day, lands from which the First Nation was entitled to 
exclude all others, even the Crown. 
However, the Bernard and Marshall decisions introduced new 
language into the definition of Aboriginal title. The mantra “exclusive 
use and occupation” is now more adjective intense. In order to establish 
title to land, a claimant must demonstrate that their activity was 
“sufficiently regular and exclusive” and thus, comports with title at 
common law.5  
This expanded definition severely limits the expectation of the size 
of a tract that can be declared subject to Aboriginal title. The 
speculation after Delgamuukw was that all of the territory between and 
around an even infrequently used hunting tract would qualify as 
Aboriginal title. Some might say that now, only actual village sites can 
qualify.  
                                                                                                            
4 See: R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter “Marshall 
1”], at para. 25: “Starvation breeds discontent. The British certainly did not want the Mi’kmaq to 
become an unnecessary drain on the public purse of the colony of Nova Scotia or of the Imperial 
purse in London, as the trial judge found.” … “The same strategy of economic aboriginal self-
sufficiency was pursued across the prairies in terms of hunting: see R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 901, per Wilson J., at p. 919, and Cory J., at p. 928. and para. 35 “The trade clause would 
not have advanced British objectives (peaceful relations with a self-sufficient Mi’kmaq people) or 
Mi’kmaq objectives (access to the European “necessaries” on which they had come to rely) unless 
the Mi’kmaq were assured at the same time of continuing access, implicitly or explicitly, to a 
harvest of wildlife to trade.” 
5 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra, note 1, at para. 58. 
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III. MIKISEW CREE V. CANADA 
The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) on November 
24, 2005. 
The Court set aside a decision of the Minister of Heritage 
authorizing construction of a winter road in Wood Buffalo National 
Park. It found the Crown has an obligation to meaningfully consult 
Treaty 8 First Nations on decisions that may interfere with their right to 
hunt, trap and fish within the treaty territory, and that this duty had not 
been adequately met. 
1. Background 
Treaty 8 was made in 1899 and extends across what is now northern 
Alberta and parts of British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Northwest 
Territories. It provides for the Indians’ right “ . . . to pursue their usual 
vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract 
surrendered . . . saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or 
taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or 
other purposes.” 
The treaty encompasses Wood Buffalo National Park, within whose 
boundaries the Mikisew Cree First Nation have reserve land and carry 
on traditional hunting, fishing and trapping activities. 
The Thebacha Road Society, an umbrella organization of 
community and other Aboriginal interests in the vicinity of the park, 
proposed and sought permission to construct the road through the park. 
As planned, it would have cut across the hunting and trapping territory 
of certain members of the Mikisew Cree First Nation. Following an 
environmental review, and some limited communications with the First 
Nation and its members, the Minister of Heritage (then responsible for 
the park) approved construction of the road. 
At issue was whether the Minister of Heritage infringed the Treaty 8 
rights of the First Nation in approving the road, and the nature of the 
Crown’s obligations when “taking up” land pursuant to the treaty. The 
Crown argued the road did not infringe the treaty because the taking up 
or proposed use was contemplated by the treaty, and that the 
communications with the First Nation constituted adequate consultation 
in the circumstances. 
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2. The Decision 
The Court accepted the Crown’s argument that the road was one of the 
purposes contemplated by the treaty for which land may be taken up, 
and was not an infringement of the treaty right requiring justification. It 
found, however, that the Crown had an obligation to consult with the 
Mikisew Cree First Nation, whose treaty rights would be adversely 
affected by the construction of the road, and that on the facts of this case 
the duty was not met, the consultation never having effectively “got off 
the ground”. 
The Court found that the duty to consult flows from the honour of 
the Crown and its obligation to respect existing treaty rights, and is a 
“process” right. It also stated “... consultation is key to achievement of 
the overall objective of the modern law of treaty and aboriginal rights, 
namely, reconciliation.” 
Though the duty to consult arises whenever the low threshold of an 
“adverse impact” is evident, its content will vary with the degree of 
adverse impact. In the circumstances here its content was said to lie at 
the low end of the spectrum, but to be meaningful had to be direct, and 
in advance of any decision being made. It required notice and 
information about the project be provided, and interests and concerns be 
solicited, identified, and considered so that adverse impacts might be 
minimized, and where appropriate, concerns accommodated. 
3. Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada 
The concept of “the honour of the Crown” has been articulated by courts 
in reasons for judgment for years, indeed for centuries.  However, it has 
moved into the spotlight in the past two years, and appears to be 
replacing fiduciary duty as the construct employed by courts to achieve 
what they believe to be the fair and just result.  
In Mikisew Cree, the “honour of the Crown” was applied to 
require that the Crown managed the infringing changes authorized in 
the treaty honourably. 
However, the Supreme Court has previously held that it applies as a 
source of obligation independently of treaties as well. It has invoked the 
“honour of the Crown” as a central principle in resolving Aboriginal 
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claims to consultation in Aboriginal rights cases, both custom and 
practice rights, and land ownership rights.6 
In Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J. extended its application to 
process: 
The honour of the Crown also infuses the processes of treaty making 
and treaty interpretation. In making and applying treaties, the Crown 
must act with honour and integrity, …7 
Justice Binnie potentially extended the blanket of the protection of 
the honour of the Crown to each and every aspect of Crown-First Nation 
relations. In Mikisew Cree he wrote: 
… the honour of the Crown was pledged to the fulfilment of its 
obligations to the Indians. This had been the Crown’s policy as far 
back as the Royal Proclamation of 1763.8  
Mikisew Cree infuses the honour of the Crown in the performance 
of every treaty obligation, from the making of a treaty, to interpreting a 
treaty, to applying treaty, and confirms that the concept will apply 
equally to Aboriginal rights as a central principle in resolving 
Aboriginal claims to consultation.  
And so the Supreme Court has signalled that where there are 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights, these will be rigorously, if not ferociously 
protected by courts.  
IV. THE BALANCE IN THE RESULT 
In the time following the Delgamuukw decision, it was reasonable to 
predict that Aboriginal title would be based on the area over which a 
First Nation asserted sovereignty. Whatever the area ranged by a First 
Nation, whatever the intensity or frequency of use of a hunting or 
gathering ground, if it was travelled or used by a First Nation, it was 
considered to have the potential to be the Aboriginal title land of these 
users of the land at the time of sovereignty.   
                                                                                                            
6 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
(Ministry of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 and Taku River Tlingit Nation v. 
British Columbia, [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550. 
7 Haida Nation, id., at para. 19. See also para. 35. 
8 Mikisew Cree, supra, note 3, at para. 51. 
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The Marshall and Bernard decisions changed all that. In these 
decisions, the Supreme Court established the parameters of the lands 
that could be set aside for the exclusive use of the pre-sovereignty 
inhabitants. Common law Aboriginal title is now restricted to the areas 
that were actually used, frequently, by a First Nation community. 
Village sites will qualify, as will farms and perhaps hunting and 
gathering areas adjacent to the village sites if they were sufficiently 
regularly and exclusively used by the community. 
These areas will roughly correspond, as a matter of historical fact, to 
the areas reserved in the pre-Confederation and numbered treaties that 
are now known as “reserves”. Aboriginal title will not extend over 
massive areas such as British Columbia, and the concern that Aboriginal 
peoples will be able to exclude all others from the use of such areas, is 
lifted.   
Similarly, treaty rights will evolve, but not into the modern 
equivalent of the right protected by the treaty. Rather, only the means of 
exercising the right will receive constitutional protection. That means 
that historic custom and practices will continue, but not their modern 
equivalent. Gathering wood to build structures will not evolve into 
gathering lumber to sell to builders of subdivisions. 
The implication of the Bernard and Marshall decisions is that an 
Aboriginal title land base will not be so extensive as to literally exclude 
(at least without the necessity of government expropriation after full 
compensation) non-Aboriginal communities from the use of huge tracts 
of land — in the case of British Columbia, most of the province. Treaty 
rights will not be so extensive that they invade the current economy and 
carve out large portions for the exclusive benefit of the holders of the 
treaty rights. 
Rather, Aboriginal title will be protected based on the formula that 
roughly equates to that reflected in the historic treaties, sufficient land to 
establish and maintain a community that sustains some level of 
exploitation, with use for such activities as hunting, fishing and 
gathering together with the non-Aboriginal community, over a larger 
area. Treaty rights will be protected based on the principle that it is the 
preservation of traditional customs and practices and the traditional 
economy that are to be preserved, not the right to participate on a 
priority basis in all aspects of the modern economy.  
In Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court of Canada held that although 
the Crown had a right, recognized in a treaty, to build a road, it could 
not do so in any way that had even a modest negative impact on 
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adjacent treaty protected reserve lands, at least without meaningful and 
respectful consultation. 
What the Supreme Court of Canada has signalled in this year’s 
leading decisions is that “firstness” alone will not result in entitlement to 
constitutionally protected participation in the economy. It has also 
signalled, on the other hand, that where a constitutionally protected right 
exists, or may just possibly exist, it must receive a very high degree of 
deference and respect and no amount of infringement will be tolerated 
without (meaningful) consultation with the affected First Nation.  
More importantly, the Court has signalled that it is not a preferential 
share of the economy that is protected by section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982,9 but rather their diversity, the unique cultural identity of First 
Nation peoples.  
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court of Canada has this year 
reinforced the position it so clearly expressed in R. v. Van Der Peet:  
Section 35(1) provides the constitutional framework though which the 
fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their 
own practices, customs and traditions, is acknowledged and reconciled 
with the sovereignty of the Crown. 10 
It is the distinctiveness, the practices, customs and traditions that 
attract constitutional protection. Economic rights, whether section 35 
rights or Charter rights, are not protected by the Canadian Constitution. 
                                                                                                            
9 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
10 [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
 
 
 
